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Introduction  
 
There are some generalized truths and discursive conceptions surrounding the issues of 
extremism and radicalization. One of these is that terrorism and violence are always preceded 
by extremism and radicalization and that individuals at risk can be identified by the 
observation of risk indicators (Borum, 2011; Sedgwick, 2010). In the current global “war on 
terrorism” (Hodges, 2011), governments all over the world have been forced to broaden their 
recognition of actors who can be useful in efforts to prevent radicalization and terrorism. The 
task of preventing violent extremism (PVE) is no longer a matter for security services alone, 
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Abstract 
Few initiatives and actions for dealing with and countering violent extremism and 
preventing terrorism focus on offering support to individuals who know people 
who are at risk of becoming involved in a violent extremist milieu. In Sweden, the 
non-governmental organization (NGO) Save the Children was commissioned to 
set up a support helpline specifically for these individuals. This study analyzed 98 
documented helpline cases dealing with Islamic and right-wing extremist milieus, 
and explored what causes concern about radicalization as well as the similarities 
and differences in the causes of concern for these two milieus. The analysis 
reveals a somewhat normative radicalization discourse as a concern in Islamic 
extremism focused on religious practice and potential cognitive factors, while 
concern in right-wing extremism primarily occurs when a youth has joined an 
organization or practiced activism. 
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but also for family members, teachers, doctors, nurses, social workers, civil society actors, 
and religious organizations and their representatives (Ragazzi, 2017).  
Although evidence of the success of interventions intended to prevent and counter 
extremism and radicalization seems difficult to validate (Eriksson, Beckman, & Sager, 2018; 
Feddes & Gallucci 2015), there are many initiatives, programs, and interventions aimed at 
preventing extremist crime and violence. Most of these are targeted at professionals who meet 
young people in their everyday working lives, but there are also initiatives aimed at 
supporting those who may be affected by violent extremism. Some of these initiatives are run 
by governmental institutions and agencies, and others by non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs). A number of organizations offer individual counselling and support via helplines for 
relatives and friends of individuals who are being radicalized (Koehler, 2017), and there is 
some research supporting the importance of such services being available (Fukkink, Bruns, 
and Ligtvoet 2017; Koehler 2017; Williams, Bélanger, Horgan, and Evans, 2018). One of the 
organizations offering such a helpline is Save the Children Sweden, which was commissioned 
by the Swedish National Coordinator Against Violent Extremism to manage a national 
helpline to support individuals with their concerns about radicalization and violent extremism. 
The objective of the helpline was not only to offer emotional and practical support but also to 
put relatives and professionals in contact with local agencies, practitioners, and NGOs that 
could advise and assist them. The individuals who access a helpline are often concerned about 
something that they experience as being out of the ordinary, and it could be of interest to ask: 
What is the behavior of concern?  
This study is based on 98 documented cases of concern related to violent extremism 
and radicalization handled by the Swedish branch of the Save the Children helpline. It focuses 
on signs of concern to callers who requested support on questions related to Islamic and right-
wing extremism. Thus, the aim of the article is to explore a contemporary discourse on 
concern about radicalization by analyzing these cases and addressing the following research 
questions: 
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• What are the signs of concern about radicalization cited by individuals who contact a 
helpline, and what can these tell us about the radicalization discourse? 
 
By exploring this topic, the similarities and differences in the signs of concern related to 
Islamic versus right-wing extremism are also considered. 
 
Preventing Violent Extremism (PVE), Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) and 
Assessing Individuals at Risk 
 
As Heath-Kelly (2013) has argued, dominating knowledge and discourses about 
radicalization and extremism produce and legitimize policy and actions that are in line with 
the explanatory discourses. Apparently, there are differences between CVE as a reactive 
countering approach and PVE as a proactive preventive approach that have emerged as a 
subfield in the struggle against terrorism (Romaniuk, 2015). In intertwining these different 
approaches, some mistakes have been made, for instance when security measures have been 
incorporated into social environments. Previous studies have shown that preventive 
measures may run the risk of becoming counterproductive in their sometimes anti-
democratic practices (Kundnani, 2015; Mattsson, 2016; O’Donnell, 2016; Thomas, 2016). In 
some instances, attempts to safeguard democracy have turned into contests between 
democratic values and human rights, which have given rise to significant academic criticism. 
One such criticism concerns the task given to frontline personnel, for instance, educational 
staff in the Western world who have found themselves gradually being transformed into the 
eyes and ears of the security services as they have been given a responsibility to use lists of 
indicators of risk, and to observe, investigate, and report suspicious behavior and signs of 
radicalization in their students (i.e., Lindekilde, 2012; Mattsson, 2018; O’Donnell, 2015; 
Ragazzi, 2017).  
 To detect when a young individual, no matter the reason, is at risk of coming to or 
doing harm, and to intervene is of great importance of course. The ethical guidelines for 
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schools and social services generally oblige professionals to intervene when someone is 
showing signs of being at risk (Mattsson, 2018; Rousseau, Ellis & Lantos, 2017). 
Theoretically, individuals who are identified and assessed as being at risk can then be 
offered access to interventions (Sarma, 2017). However, the task (which in some places is an 
obligation) to observe, investigate and sometimes report signs of radicalization is a new task 
that might be plagued with problems. In schools for instance, it can be experienced as a 
degradation of teachers’ professionalism as educational experts, forcing them to function as 
informants, which can hinder the relationship between students and teachers. This can be a 
serious consequence. Studies have also shown that students experience that they are not 
allowed to or do not dare to express their religious or ideological beliefs in school because 
they feel at risk of being reported for them (O’Donnell, 2016).  
 Furthermore, the signs of radicalization that teachers or other professionals are 
supposed to detect seem to have little scientific basis (Gill et al., 2014; Monahan, 2017; 
Thomas, 2016). Also, they are critiqued for being too individualistic and for not taking social 
context, background or psychological aspects into consideration (Desmarais, Simons-
Rudolph, Brugh, Schilling & Hoggan, 2017; Sarma 2017; Knudsen, 2018). As acknowledged 
by Rosseau et al. (2017) when they considered the role of health, social services and 
educational interventions within the war on terror context, vulnerability or distress among 
youth may sometimes manifest itself with the same signs listed as signs of someone being at 
risk of becoming radicalized. Policies that advocate increased surveillance and identification 
of young individuals at risk have not led to improved identification of potential future 
offenders. “Instead these measures have shattered the trust in the education system not only 
for targeted students, but also for their parents and peers” (ibid. p.2).  
In an analysis of risk assessments in England and Wales, Knudsen (2018) discusses 
some of the more commonly used assessment tools and refers to them as “radicalization 
snapshots of a person’s psychology at the moment an assessment is being carried out; 
possibly sharp and accurate, but nonetheless narrow and frozen in time” (ibid. p8). These 
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radicalization snapshots are used to evaluate a person’s probable future and enable a 
translation of this probable future into possible actions for preventing potential violence.  
Among important issues related to risk assessments, Sarma (2017) points out that there 
needs to be a clear specification of what it is that is supposed to be predicted and also that a 
risk assessor needs to have both experience of, or expertise in, how to assess risks. In Swedish 
policy and national action plans against radicalization and extremism (SOU 2013:81), in cases 
of concern professionals are referred to additional material for conversational support. The 
conversational support issued by the national coordinator against violent extremism 
(Nationella samordnaren mot våldsbejakande extremism, 2014) lists signs of concern that 
involve the use of symbols, changes in attire, new friends, starting or quitting smoking, 
downloading or sharing extremist material on the Internet, growing facial hair, or getting a 
tattoo. The same indicators or signs are also used in a majority of the action plans formulated 
by Sweden’s municipalities for dealing with extremism at the local level (Andersson Malmros 
& Mattson (2017), and also for example in the Swedish Police’s support handbook for 
preventing violent extremism (Polisen, 2017). Furthermore, professionals are encouraged to 
take note of individuals expressing radical attitudes, giving voice to conspiracy theories, or 
legitimizing violence as a means of effecting social change. The materials also give examples 
of attitudes, opinions, and relationships that should cause concern. These are said to be 
evident when young individuals express intolerant views, reject democratic principles, and are 
convinced that their own views are the only relevant ones, and when they try to argue and 
convince others to accept their ideas. Furthermore, expressing conspiracy theories, perceiving 
others as enemies, and vocalizing hatred against certain groups such as Jews, Muslims, 
Swedes, capitalists, immigrants, or homosexuals, are listed as signs of concern. However, as 
they are formulated, the criteria and behavioral indicators of radicalization are not related to 
actual risk but to potential risk. Thus, teachers and other professionals are sometimes asked to 
hypothesize a future crime that will probably never be committed (Mattsson, 2018). In the 
words of Knudsen (2018, p.9) “The condition of being radicalised comes to resemble being 
‘pregnant’ with a form of risk that is potent but as of yet unrealized: while possible outcomes 
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for the radicalised are not unlimited, the condition’s precise materialisation will depend on the 
effectiveness of the interventionist actions”. 
Another frequent criticism is that in the wake of contemporary discourses on Islamic 
terrorism across Europe and the increased securitizing of society, PVE practices tend to focus 
on Muslim communities. Numerous studies and reports have shown how European Muslims 
are being targeted as a suspicious community, and discourses of suspicion are reinforced by 
policies and action plans aimed at PVE (Coppock & McGovern, 2014; Guru, 2012; Human 
Rights Watch, UK, 2016; Kühler & Lindekilde, 2012; Kundnani, 2015; Ragazzi, 2017). Such 
practices and discourses may lead to a further construction of ideas and perceptions of who 
might be at risk of becoming radicalized. 
 
Involving the Social Environment in PVE 
 
Relatives, friends, and family have been recognized as “associate gatekeepers” who can be of 
essential value in ensuring that preventive actions and programs reach their target groups 
(Williams, Horgan, & Evans, 2015). The social environment, especially one where family and 
friends are present, is often the space in which radicalization evolves and where it can first be 
noted (Koehler, 2015). It is also recognized that pro-social ties such as family and friends are 
of great importance to the efficacy of any intervention (Koehler, 2017). Thus, there are 
reasons for recognizing the importance of involving the social environment in early 
interventions against extremism. Studies of former extremists and their families have also 
shown that relatives and friends play a crucial support role for those who disengage from 
extremist violence. The desire for a “normal life” seems to be one of the most important 
factors for individual disengagement, and social support from “the outside” and the 
mobilization of family support are the most decisive aspects for the will and ability to leave 
(Bjørgo & Horgan, 2009; Carlsson, 2016; Koehler, 2017). Therefore, there are good reasons 
to focus on supporting family and other relatives in the struggle against extremism and 
radicalization, and to not use them solely as sources of security information.   
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However, having a friend, family member, or loved one involved in extremism can 
cause worry, shame, and grief. Furthermore, relatives are often stigmatized and ostracized due 
to the actions or attitudes of their loved ones (Guru, 2012; Koehler, & Ehrt, 2018; Simi, 
Sporer, & Bubolz, 2016). Also, peers might be reluctant to reach out for help as they may fear 
getting themselves or their friend in trouble (Williams, Horgan, Evans, 2015). Based on their 
interviews with the parents of deceased foreign fighters, Koehler and Ehrt (2018) described 
how families became branded as criminals and how, in some cases, child welfare services, 
assuming that the parents had violated their fiduciary or parental duty of care, attempted to 
take the remaining children from the family. The authors concluded that “it is very hard to 
understand some of the extraordinary stress being put on those families in addition to their 
loss due to the lack of structured support” (Koehler & Ehrt, 2018, p. 192). It is also easy to 
understand why some of these families and friends might find it hard to trust government 
agencies.  
In researching the behavior of 119 lone actors convicted of preparations for or 
committing terrorist crimes, Gill, Horgan, and Deckert (2014) showed that, in most of these 
cases, there was someone close or related to them who was aware of the perpetrator’s 
grievances with society. In 80% of the cases, someone knew about the perpetrator’s extremist 
ideas and attitudes. Furthermore, nearly 50% had told their family and friends that they 
intended to commit a terrorist crime, and 40% had a history of previous involvement in 
criminal acts. It is noteworthy that a large proportion (32%) of the felons had a history of 
psychiatric disease or mental illness. These figures say little about who the terrorist or 
extremist is, and in line with other studies in this area, Gill et al. (2014) found no common 
perpetrator profile of the terrorist offender in the literature. There are no control groups of 
similar delinquencies with which to make any comparisons or establish any correlations. This 
led the authors to conclude that individuals who commit terrorist crimes are characterized by 
what they do, rather than by who they are, and what they do seems to be known by family and 
friends.  
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In Sweden, as in the other Nordic countries, frontline practitioners are believed to have 
a certain role in preventing young individuals from harming others or coming to harm 
themselves. However according to Herz (2016), frontline personnel should be given the 
chance to create safe environments for meeting young people in their everyday professional 
work. Frontline personnel have a unique position and are significant when it comes to 
strengthening young people’s trust in the adult world. Recent studies have shown that a 
number of scholars agree that this privileged position can be utilized to work with 
democratizing practices in teaching for instance, and cite the use of dialogue and controversial 
issues as a pedagogical tool for democratization (Mattsson, 2018; O’Donnell, 2015; Thomas, 
2016). According to the Swedish Board of Health and Welfare (Socialstyrelsen, 2018), 
support for individuals involved with violent extremist milieus is sometimes met with 
skepticism by the general public. There are obvious complications associated with supporting 
individuals who have or have had extremist views. Social workers also found that there are 
ambiguities in how cases of extremism or radicalization should be handled and how personnel 
should act when they come in contact with individuals who are involved with extremist 
milieus (Socialstyrelsen, 2018). 
 
Helplines 
 
In an effort to protect and support citizens who have concerns related to extremism, several 
initiatives have arisen in Europe. Some of these are helplines or hotlines where individuals 
can call and speak with experts about their concerns. According to Koehler (2015), this kind 
of support can be regarded as effective, especially when it comes to outreach and availability. 
The importance of this kind of service is also in line with Williams, Horgan, Evans & 
Bélanger (2018), who advocate affording gatekeepers and vicarious help-seekers with a 
channel for communication that can circumvent their fear of getting in trouble. 
Sweden’s Save the Children Helpline was not intended as a deradicalization program. It 
was established based on previous experiences of providing helplines for asylum seekers and 
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refugees, and intended to be a support service for those in need of someone to talk to, and 
those who needed support in handling a difficult situation. It was also meant to guide 
individuals and to establish contacts between intervention providers and the individual 
believed to be at risk of radicalization. Thus, the helpline’s purpose was to help the families 
and the friends of people tempted by radical extremism. There are some studies showing that 
helplines can do just that. For instance, Williams et al. (2018) concluded that support 
helplines can fulfill a need by empowering those who are aware of a friend or relative who 
has the intent to commit a terrorist crime and helping them to intervene before an attack can 
occur.  
In studies of helpline counselling for people in need, Fukkink et al. (2017) highlighted 
the positive impact of helplines due to their immediate and accessible support for children and 
young people. Helplines come at a fairly low cost, are easily accessible, offer anonymity, and 
provide quick responses and support for those in need. Furthermore, helplines have the 
potential to fill the void when professional interventions are absent or inadequate. In studies 
of Australian helplines, Burgess et al. (2008) explored the mental health status of people who 
turn to a helpline. The researchers found that those who initiated contact with a helpline were 
often experiencing loneliness and experienced higher degrees of suffering from worries, 
depression, and anxiety than the general population (see also Ingram et al., 2008). Thus, it 
could be argued that there is a need for helplines to help people deal with their worries and 
anxiety. Helplines providing psychosocial support for young individuals in need of 
compassion, support, and advice may be of great importance to those seeking meaning and 
guidance. Among the incoming calls, abuse, violence, mental health, and problems with the 
adult environment have been found to be the most common topics (Burgess et al., 2008; 
Fukkink et al., 2017; Ingram et al., 2008).  
Although helplines have an important function, Ingram et al. (2008) concluded that, 
given a heterogeneous help-seeking population, helplines tended to have a narrow area of 
focus and a limited outreach. They noted that “[w]ith many people in need of mental health, 
emotional support, and substance abuse services, crisis hotlines are in a position to provide 
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services to a large number of people” (Ingram et al., 2008, p. 672). However, the study 
indicated that callers felt safer, calmer, and more confident after being in contact with the 
helpline than they were before initiating the contact. The researchers also stated that there is 
every reason for using additional techniques, such as online chat services, in order to reach the 
younger population. Online communication can provide anonymity, making some people feel 
safe, protected, and more prone to speak about themselves. Fukkink and Herrmanns (2009) 
compared children’s experiences of support provided by telephone with support received 
online and found that there were no qualitative differences. Some of the help-seekers 
preferred to chat online, while others preferred to speak to someone on the telephone. In both 
instances, children stated a higher degree of well-being and a lower degree of concern after 
being in contact with a helpline service. Their choice of chat or telephone support was based 
on their own preference, which suggests the importance of having various communication 
alternatives to choose from (Williams et al. 2015).   
 
Studying the Save the Children Helpline Against Radicalization 
 
In the spring of 2017, Sweden’s former national coordinator against extremism and 
radicalization commissioned the NGO Save the Children to manage the national telephone 
helpline for individuals with concerns about radicalization and extremism. According to a 
Swedish Government Official Report (SOU 2017:110), there was a need for a preventive 
initiative targeting relatives and friends of individuals at risk of becoming radicalized. The 
helpline was to function as a coordinating service to direct individuals to the appropriate local 
services within their area. The directive for the helpline also stated that those operating such a 
helpline should be experienced in giving support and guidance to people in need. To make it 
clear that the helpline was intended to aid those who had concerns for others at risk of being 
harmed from involvement in a violent extremist movement, Save the Children named the 
helpline Orostelefonen om radikalisering, which roughly translates as the “radicalization 
concerns helpline” (Rädda Barnen, 2017). The helpline primarily focused on support services 
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for relatives, friends, and family, but also functioned as a support for individuals worried 
about themselves being attracted to an extremist ideology or becoming involved in something 
that they were not able to handle. In Sweden, this was the only initiative of its kind, and this 
kind of support for relatives and friends was not offered by any other governmental 
organization or NGO. Professionals who worked with individuals causing concern were 
likewise welcome to contact the helpline. The helpline was evaluated by Save the Children in 
2017 (Rädda Barnen, 2017) and the report shows that individuals who make contact often 
return for more support and advice. The statistical material in the report also show that 
individuals of all ages caused concern, and that the need for support seemed to be steadily 
increasing. 
In the spring of 2018, the newly commissioned Swedish Center for Preventing Violent 
Extremism took over the responsibility for handling issues related to violent extremism and 
radicalization in Sweden. In order to centralize these efforts, they decided to initiate a support 
service for professionals experiencing dilemmas related to extremism or radicalization. At the 
same time, they decided not to provide any financial support to the Save the Children 
helpline. For a period of time, the helpline was maintained by the organization’s internal 
funding, but, by the end of 2018, the helpline was closed down. The new helpline run by the 
Swedish Center for Preventing Violent Extremism does not address the families and friends of 
radicalized individuals; thus, this support is now lacking.  
Through cooperation and an agreement between Save the Children and the Segerstedt 
Institute at the University of Gothenburg, a joint study about the helpline as a preventive 
initiative was begun in early 2018. At that point, the aims of the study were to evaluate the 
incoming cases and the support provided by the helpline, and to facilitate methodology 
development and improve the efficacy of the helpline. Also, as Fukkink, Bruns, and Ligtvoet 
(2017) stated, studies of helplines can offer a small window into people’s hearts and minds. 
The concern about radicalization expressed by those affected by it can offer such a window, 
and provide some important insights for the radicalization discourse, and on how to handle 
concerns and potential risks in the future.  
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This study focused on those cases where individuals were concerned about 
radicalization, and we attempted to determine what made them fear that others in their 
immediate vicinity were becoming radicalized. For this purpose, we utilized the 
documentation systems that the counselors were already using, or rather the documents 
produced in the system. The researchers did not have access to the digitalized documentation 
system. The counselors documented the calls in anonymized case files, noting gender and age 
(if this was mentioned), and the type of concern of the individual in focus. No names, places, 
or other identifiable information were mentioned in the documentation. In some cases, the 
counselor documented personal reflections or specific quotations from the caller that they 
found significant for the particular case. The data used for this study consisted of the 
counselors’ textual documentation of the calls made in the 98 cases and not the actual calls 
themselves. This meant that neither the counselors nor the researchers were aware of any 
identifying personal data about the individual of concern in the documented cases. This way 
of using secondary empirical data (the counselors’ recollections and documentation of the 
cases) could be a limitation of the study, since the data was translated twice (by the counselor 
and by the researcher). Considering the nature of the material, this was also a way of 
minimizing the data collected and thus safeguarding the privacy of the individuals involved. 
Since the material was also translated from Swedish into English, this further protected the 
identities of the actors involved.  
During the period from February 2017 to May 2018, the Save the Children helpline 
handled in total 154 cases of concern about radicalization and extremism. Some of these were 
one-time callers, while others returned to the helpline or followed up the conversation by 
seeking more support and guidance. Some of the cases went on for over six months. In total, 
the documentation involved more than 360 calls made within the scope of the 154 cases. Of 
these, 43 cases were categorized by the counselor as general concerns or information calls, 
three cases were defined as related to left-wing extremism, and 98 cases were concerned with 
Islamic and right-wing extremism and/or radicalization. Thus, the results were based on these 
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98 remaining cases: 62 of these were categorized as concerns about Islamic extremism, and 
36 cases were categorized as concerns about right-wing extremism. 
 
Methodology 
 
The results of a qualitative study are predicated on the questions asked and the precision of 
the tools used to conduct the analysis. In this study, one such important question, following 
the work of Gill et al. (2014), was What do they do? — what the individual did or was doing 
that caused the caller’s apprehension and concern about radicalization. Furthermore, it was 
about Who are they? –– the individual aspects that emerged from the signs of concern and 
which occurred as differences and similarities within the radicalization discourse.  
To make the data manageable, the analysis began with a thematic coding based on the 
different milieus and how the signs of concern were documented by the counselor in 
accordance with what they do. In line with Potter and Wetherell (1987), the initial coding had 
the pragmatic aim of giving the material a framework in order to reveal its potential focal 
points. In reading the coded material, the form, limitations, and core of the caller’s concern in 
relation to extremism and radicalization emerged. Concerns related to what they do and who 
they are were coded into nodes using a computerized analysis program for qualitative data.  
One of the objectives of this study was to explore some signs of concern about 
radicalization and to see what this could tell us about the radicalization discourse. This was 
not meant to imply a discourse analytical approach. Rather it is about the theoretical 
standpoint that discourses are evident in the public debate and in the shared common language 
people use to make a problem or an object of concern manageable and possible to speak about 
(Foucault, 1971). In this case, it was about saying something about the discourse itself in 
order to examine its external limitations and the conditions for its existence, and to some 
extent explore what the discourse is creating. Thus, the methodology was more an analysis of 
a discourse than a textbook discourse analysis. 
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Results 
 
The aim of this study was to explore a contemporary discourse of concern about radicalization 
by addressing the research question: What are the signs of concern about radicalization cited 
by individuals who contact a helpline, and what can these tell us about the radicalization 
discourse? Also, the similarities and differences in signs of concern related to Islamic and 
right-wing extremism were a focus of the analysis. The results section gives a brief overview 
of the case material, followed by a more in-depth analysis of the relevant themes. The 
excerpts used in the text are meant to exemplify recurring themes and are taken from the 
counselors’ documentation of the cases. The quotations have been translated by the author to 
approximate the meaning of the original quotations as these were documented in Swedish. 
 
The Cases 
 
The case material consisted of 98 cases where callers initiated contact with the helpline. The 
calls came from various actors as illustrated by the following table.  
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Actors  Concern about Islamic  
Extremism  
Concern about Right-Wing 
Extremism 
The individual him/herself 1 4 
Relative or friend 17 25 
School personnel, nurse, social 
worker, psychologist, Police 
35 6 
Personnel at home for 
unaccompanied minors  
6 1 
Civil society actor 3  
 = 62 cases =36 cases 
Table 1. The callers and the number of cases related to the milieus of concern   
 The common denominator among those who made contact with the helpline was that 
they were concerned about someone with whom they came into daily contact, and also found 
themselves in a situation where they lacked guidelines on how to act or behave around the 
young individual. They were often seeking help that could not be found within the ordinary 
social services. Their purpose in making contact was to obtain support and advice; 
occasionally, there was a need to be relieved of the responsibility of being the one in 
possession of potentially harmful information if anything were to go wrong. The 62 cases 
related to Islamic extremism came from relatives and from teachers or educational institution 
staff, but most frequently from social workers concerned about a young individual, often a 
young man (primarily someone who was legally defined as an unaccompanied minor), who 
they feared was becoming radicalized. Of the remaining cases, six calls came from the 
Swedish Police, psychiatrists, and civil society actors. The 36 cases concerned with right-
wing extremism came primarily from friends and family, but also from individuals who were 
concerned about their own position and attraction to a right-wing ideology or organization. 
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However, how these concerns were expressed varied, and were sometimes focused on the 
desire to talk about and justify extremist views. The remaining calls about right-wing 
extremism were made by educational institution staff and social workers. 
In comparison, Islamic extremism attracted the most attention from external 
(professional) callers: 71% of the calls related to Islamic radicalization came from such 
actors, i.e., not family or friends. This may be a consequence of the fact that there are many 
unaccompanied refugee minors involved in these cases and that these youngsters are often in 
contact with social workers and caretakers who have a professional but not necessarily any 
emotional responsibility for them (Stretmo, 2014). There is also some general societal 
suspicion surrounding unaccompanied refugee minors, especially when they are boys. Boys 
are generally regarded as potential troublemakers (Hedlund, 2018). In addition, contemporary 
discourses on radicalization that turn young Muslims into potential future terrorists cast 
suspicion on them (Copprock & McGovern, 2014; Thomas, 2016). Furthermore, young 
refugees often do not have the social network of family and friends that the radical 
nationalistic youngsters in the analyzed data had. These youngsters are often born into and 
raised by their own families. Seventy percent of the callers concerned about right-wing 
extremism were relatives and friends.  
Callers that defined themselves as family or relatives, irrespective of the ideological 
milieu of concern, stated that extremism and radicalization was a taboo subject that caused a 
certain amount of shame and guilt. As one parent stated when conversing with one of the 
counsellors: “As a parent, you feel worry, frustration, and grief, and it feels good to be able to 
talk about it.” The notion of guilt and grief is common among relatives who experience that 
their loved ones are attracted to an extreme ideology (Brittain, 2009; Spalek, 2016). It can be 
emotionally difficult to discuss these issues with friends or coworkers, and parents often feel 
that they are viewed as complicit and thus run the risk of being ostracized (Guru, 2012). In the 
following section, we group the signs of concern into (re)occurring themes, based on what the 
individuals did that caused concerns about radicalization.  
  
 
 
 
 
Jennie Sivenbring: Signs of Concern about Islamic and Right-Wing Extremism on a Helpline 
against Radicalization 
 
 
 
 
124 
Signs of Concern: What They Do 
 When posing the question What do they do? the objective was more specifically: what 
is the behavior of concern? (Sarma, 2017). In analyzing these behaviors, similarities were 
linked to religious practice, ideological belief, mental health, social relationships, and 
interactions on the Internet. Even if these signs and themes were evident in concerns about 
both right-wing and Islamic radicalization, there were noteworthy internal differences 
dependent on who the individual of concern was.  
 Likewise, there were more evident differences and distinct themes concerned with the 
explicitness of expressing extreme or radical attitudes and religious practice. There were also 
differences in how actions could be interpreted related to the nature of the extreme milieu in 
focus for the caller which reflected radicalization as being a normative construct. Thus, it was 
essential to determine what a suspected extremist did that was interpreted as signs of 
radicalization and thus caused concern.  
They Express and Practice Religious or Ideological Beliefs 
 Signs of concern related to expressions and practices of religious and ideological 
beliefs took a different form depending on who the subject of concern was, who the caller 
was, and what the milieu in focus was. This was most evident in the differences between 
external (professional) and internal (related) callers.  
 The exercise of religious practice was the most common sign (mentioned in more than 
half of the cases) of concern among the cases related to Islamic extremism. The caller, who 
was most often a professional in social care or at an educational institution, expressed concern 
about a young individual becoming more isolated as a result of him converting to Islam. As 
young boys convert to or get more involved in religious Islam, they can change and become 
more actively religious. Boys who pray, fast during Ramadan, perform ritual ablutions 
(wudu), read the Quran, or spend time in a mosque were often assessed as being at risk of 
becoming radicalized. Furthermore, changes in clothing or growing facial hair caused concern 
about such boys, especially when they were in institutional care. One caller had concerns 
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about a 17-year-old unaccompanied minor refugee boy who had expressed grievances over 
his circumstances and displayed a number of signs of mental illness. In the narrative, there 
were no signs of extremist attitudes or expressions of violence, but the caller was still 
concerned and stated: “Well, he’s religious. He has a beard and wears black clothes.” 
In the analyzed data, along with physical attributes the expression of religiosity was 
sometimes the only reason for the caller’s concern. In another case, an unaccompanied minor 
caused concern because he performed ritual ablutions before praying, and the caller feared 
that he had been radicalized. Stretmo (2018) pointed out that, for some unaccompanied minor 
refugees, religion is a central part of their lives, and something that can offer comfort and 
strength, and that affording time and space for praying can be crucial to their well-being.  
The Islamic religiously profiled terrorist deeds in Europe and the measures that have 
been taken to prevent future such deeds may have contributed to making Islam and Muslim 
communities targets of suspicion (Awan 2014; Kundnani 2015). By a discursive envisioning 
of young Muslims as “other” and as potential future terrorists, they may be constructed and 
positioned as individuals who are especially vulnerable and at risk (Copprock & Mc Govern, 
2014; Human Rights Watch, 2016; Sivenbring, 2017). The assumed connotation of Islam that 
connects it to radicalization and terrorism appears to be a figure of thought that might exclude 
other explanations.  
In the cases concerning right-wing extremism, and when the first contact with the 
helpline was initiated, the individuals causing concern had often already taken some action. 
They may have joined a right-wing extremist organization, participated in demonstrations or 
in violent confrontations with opposing groups, or participated in manifestations for a radical 
extremist cause. They often expressed racist, anti-Semitic, Islamophobic, or homophobic 
attitudes and practiced hate speech in various ways. If we look at established ideas about 
radicalization as a process (Borum, 2011; McCauley & Moskalenko, 2008; Moghaddam, 
2005), we can see that the caller, who is usually a relative or a close friend, turns for help 
when more explicit signs of radicalization toward right-wing extremism occur. In one case, a 
parent contacted the helpline due to concern for a boy who had recently engaged with a right-
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wing extreme organization and had been involved in violent activism. The parent described 
him as becoming more violent and aggressive at home and that he said, “Hitler was a true 
leader.” In succeeding conversations with the counselor, the parent described an ongoing 
search for help and support in the local community where the only answer given was that 
these cases were “not on our desk.”  
With regard to concern for right-wing extremism, the caller’s primary worry was that 
the radicalized individual would cause or come to harm, or that he or she would commit 
crimes. In the cases related to Islamic extremism, the caller was primarily concerned about 
individuals becoming radicalized and the risk of them committing acts of terrorism in the 
future. This fear was often combined with feelings of guilt and uncertainty regarding whom 
the caller could contact to get help and support to deal with the problem.  
 
They Show Signs of Mental Illness 
When callers made contact via the helpline, they were encouraged to speak about the person 
they were concerned about. In many of the cases, the callers described some kind of mental 
health issue, such as a neuropsychiatric or psychiatric diagnosis. Descriptions of school 
failure, truancy, isolation, self-harm, anxiety, depression, and paranoia occurred along with 
references to bipolar disorder, suicide attempts, and general feelings of hopelessness and 
distrust in others. However, when the concern was Islamic radicalization, these issues were 
posed as a secondary concern or mentioned in passing while speaking about radicalization as 
the real problem. This insight might contribute to (re)constructing a radicalization discourse 
that assesses individuals at risk, according to their mental health status along with their 
perceived ethnicity, nationality, and political or religious convictions. In the long run, this 
approach could be counterproductive. As Rosseau et al. (2017) argues, an increase in social 
stereotyping in relation to the war on terror, along with discrimination and exclusion, can fuel 
psychological distress among youth.  
One example of how mental health declines in the wake of a radicalization discourse 
was a call from an actor working at a home for unaccompanied minors. The caller described a 
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young boy from a minority group from Afghanistan. His narrative of flight (Stretmo, 2014) 
spoke of abuse, kidnapping, and sexual exploitation. The boy carried a lot of anxiety, shame, 
and guilt because of these experiences. The supervisor called the helpline, concerned about 
whether the boy was becoming radicalized as he had recently written the following post on 
social media: “Sweden is a terrorist state that sends children back to Afghanistan.”  
In this case, there was no other evidence of extreme or radical attitudes or talk of 
violence. However, the post on social media could be perceived as a radicalization snapshot 
(Knudsen, 2018). What he expressed was a personal view. In the summer of 2017, the time 
that this call was received, the Swedish government had started to send refugee minors back 
to Afghanistan, and applications for asylum were being rejected en masse. At the same time, 
controversial medical examinations were conducted in order to determine the biological age 
of unaccompanied refugee minors, and deportations were being conducted by the Swedish 
Police and the Swedish Migration Agency. In respect to this particular boy, the main worry 
was radicalization; whether the boy, due to previous experiences and current circumstances, 
was scared, frustrated, and worried about his own future was not even considered as the 
primary reason for his actions. Sometimes professionals may, as Rousseau et al. 2017 puts it, 
“be ill-equipped to deal with the hurt stemming from diverse social context” (ibid. p. 2). 
There have been some studies indicating that youngsters with experiences of war, violence 
and flight are more prone to developing post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) than people in 
general (Gurwitch, Kees, & Becker, 2002). Studies of unaccompanied minors in Norway 
showed that about half of the children that arrive fit the descriptors of PTSD (Jensen, 2015).  
Occasionally, it appears that the concern about radicalization and terrorism is 
overshadowing individual difficulties and grievances, and this also seems to be the case for 
mental health and well-being. Radicalization as a rational explanation is seemingly the most 
prominent of all the possible explanations for what is causing the caller’s concern for younger 
individuals. Even if some of the individuals who have committed terrorist crimes suffer from 
mental illness or psychiatric disease, there is no direct relationship between mental health and 
the execution of terrorist crimes (Gill et al., 2014). There are millions of people suffering 
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from mental health issues who never turn to extremism or violence. As stated by Desmarais et 
al. (2017), identifying associations between individual factors and terrorism as an outcome is 
of limited pragmatic use. “Although most terrorists are young, single men (…), for example, 
not all young single men are at heightened risk for terrorism” (ibid. p. 196). 
In cases with a focus on right-wing extremism, issues revolving around mental health 
were sometimes described by relatives in terms of neuropsychiatric diagnoses. In these cases, 
mental illness was posed as an explanation for the individual being attracted to an ideology 
that could provide simple solutions to complex problems. Mental illness was also illustrated 
by some individual callers who turned to the helpline with concerns for themselves and their 
own attraction to a right-wing milieu. One of these lone callers was a young man who was 
afraid of being drawn back into a white supremacist organization that he had exited from 
earlier. He described an upbringing with absent parents and dealing with relatives’ alcohol 
and drug abuse, which was the reason for him being currently in foster care. He said that he 
was struggling with anxiety, self-harm, lack of self-control, and outbursts of aggression. He 
also stated that his previous engagement with the organization was mostly about finding an 
identity and his attraction to the skinhead culture and its working class ideals. He had no racist 
attitudes, but said that he had recently become aware of what he called a “reverse racism.” 
Also, he was scared; scared of going back to the movement and that he might be forced to 
commit violent acts and carry weapons. These thoughts reentered his life in the aftermath of 
the terrorist crime in Stockholm in April 2017, when five people lost their lives as Rakhmat 
Akilov, inspired by Islamic terrorist organizations, ran them down on the street. In addition, 
the boy was left by his girlfriend, and he said, “I need something to fight for, or I will kill 
myself.” As Desmarais et al (2017, p. 196) state, “Indeed, grievances can provide the basis for 
extremist ideology and serve as an activating factor.” 
 The boy’s story was framed by the need for connection and social cohesion, an idea 
that is present in theories of radicalization and among the reasons why young people are 
attracted to violent milieus. Furthermore, his story was stereotypical in its coherence with 
theories of why young people join right-wing extremist movements. However, this is seldom 
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provided as a rational explanation when speaking about attraction to Islamist extremism. 
Simi, Sporer, and Bubolz (2016) stated that the attraction of right-wing movements lies 
beyond their ideologically simplistic explanatory models, and that the possibility of a 
vicarious family, along with status, excitement, and identity, are the primary reasons. There 
may also be personal disapproval of individuals of other races, ethnicities, religions and/or 
sexual orientations related to conflicts from childhood. In interviews with young defectors 
from neo-Nazi milieus, Kimmel (2007) showed how young individuals got a feeling of 
purpose and of being in control of their own lives through their affiliation with white 
supremacist groups. In line with Kimmel, Bjørgo (2005) found that young Nazis are attracted 
by the prospect of belonging to a group and that racism becomes the common denominator, 
but not the primary reason for their affiliation with the group. Exciting attributes, the use of 
symbols on clothing, partying, and aggressive white power music were described by the 
young individuals in Bjørgo’s study as pull factors. Mattsson and Johansson (2018) affirmed 
this notion while also focusing on push factors, such as their informants’ (former Nazis) 
beliefs that their emotional and social needs were not being met in their lives outside of the 
group.  
 
They Interact on the Internet  
Various aspects of engaging in activities on the Internet were frequently mentioned as signs of 
concern. Callers were primarily worried about not having control over or knowledge of what 
their young people were engaged in, and they described them as spending too much time 
alone in their rooms interacting on their computers. Uncertainties often emerged as these 
adults felt that they had lost control and supervision of what was going on behind closed 
doors. In some cases, callers were concerned about individuals who had posted and shared 
extremist material on social media. 
 In cases involving Islamic extremism, watching videos of imams and clips with 
extremist content caused concern, especially if the young person was also engaged in 
religious activities. Signs of concern were that youngsters were searching for news from Syria 
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and Iraq, watching or listening to clips with loud voices, watching propaganda videos from 
terrorist organizations, posting an ISIL/IS flag on Facebook, or posing in black clothes for 
photos. Callers were worried about how extreme images and content on the Internet were 
affecting the views and attitudes of the young. Searching for and sharing extremist material is 
one of the signs of radicalization that methodologies and manuals encourage professionals to 
take note of. On the one hand, the Internet and messages that are disseminated and 
communicated online cannot by themselves create extremist views in individuals. On the 
other hand, digital channels of communication and social forums on the Internet can enhance 
and encourage extreme and radical world views and conceptions that have already started to 
grow (Askanius, 2017).  
 Interaction on the Internet and social media was also an evident source of concerns 
about right-wing extremism. Downloading and sharing extremist material on social media, 
posting racist messages or images on Facebook, participating in certain discussion forums, 
and posting on right-wing extremist online forums were signs that caused concern. The 
accessibility afforded by social media sites on the Internet, and the visibility offered by social 
media, have changed how people can participate in different groups, interact and exchange 
information. As stated by Alava, Frau-Meigs, and Hassan (2017), engaging in hate speech and 
propaganda and participating in various forums and right-wing extremist organizations and 
groups online have been made more accessible to a common and wider audience. By 
comparison, for the cases revolving around Islamic radicalization, these concerns are more 
evident, and there was no doubt about what types of activities were causing concern. With 
suspected right-wing radicals, online interaction is commonly done in the open. This openness 
causes even more concern as relatives and friends are made aware of what is going on and 
often react to and question the actions of the entire family.  
 In these cases, there was also evidence of young people’s resentment of mainstream 
media and notions that it presents fake news. Callers described how their young relatives 
expressed hate and used derogatory phrases about public news services. In the data, there 
were statements to the effect that the tabloids are lying, the mainstream media cannot be 
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trusted since they have been “infiltrated by the left”, and that “all newspapers are owned by 
Jews who lie to the Swedish people”. Furthermore, there were expressions of only trusting 
media that are supported by Donald Trump or Vladimir Putin. The idea that society and its 
establishments have been sold out to “the others” (Jews and non-Europeans) behind the back 
of “the people” was discussed by Lööw (2016). She stated that most ultra-nationalistic and 
racist groups argue that the media are the bearers of a stigmatized truth and that interpreters of 
the people’s true will are being silenced and hidden by a corrupt establishment.  
 Rieger, Frischlich, and Bente (2013) concluded that the media and propaganda can 
influence emotions, perceptions, knowledge, and actions. This does not mean that extremist 
propaganda can be the sole reason for radicalization, but that propaganda can be an influential 
factor. Along with other factors, digital propaganda can be one of the pieces in a 
radicalization jigsaw puzzle (Hafez & Mullens, 2015). Thus, digital propaganda can be 
effective due to its availability and its chances of capturing and maintaining the individual’s 
interest in extremist ideas and milieus. Through interaction online in discussion forums and 
through social networks, individuals can experience coherence with like-minded people and 
gain support for their views and ideas. In Sweden, the website of the neo-Nazi organization 
Nordiska Motståndsrörlesen (Nordic Resistance Movement or NMR) Nordfront (the North 
Front) and the hate site Samhällsnytt (Society News) are notable for their publication of hate 
speech in both their articles and information and in their dissemination of user-generated 
material (Kaati, 2017). The activity on these forums has shown a significant increase over the 
past several years.  
 
What about girls?  
Overall, the data have primarily supported the argument to speak about concern for boys and 
young men. The documentation from the calls to the Save the Children helpline mainly 
concerned boys, but around 20% of the cases were about concern for young women. In these 
cases, the concerns were similar, no matter what the milieu. Concern for young women was 
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about their changing and being affected or influenced by a man or a new partner that the 
family or friends had little knowledge about or control over.  
The narrative for the cases where the caller was concerned about religious extremism 
often followed a storyline where the young woman started to change after meeting someone 
new. She started to wear traditional clothing, such as the veil or hijab. She distanced herself 
from family and friends, and she stopped her usual activities and focused more on religion 
and tradition.  
In these cases, the callers were concerned with the possibility that the woman was 
going to marry and possibly leave the country for a conflict zone. They sought guidance and 
support about how they should handle and approach their relative or friend. They had a need 
to find out more about her plans and intentions, without risking that she would turn away from 
them, which could mean a potential loss of both the relationship and control. In one case, the 
caller described a young relative who had recently converted to Islam and had become more 
isolated: “She went somewhere and became a Muslim; it escalated really quickly.”   
Travelling abroad caused concern no matter what the purpose of the trip might have 
been, and of course, the purpose was not always known to the caller. Concern for young 
women travelling to conflict zones was not unjustified. Aasgard (2017) estimated (supported 
by official reports) that since 2013, about 80 women have left Scandinavia to join Islamic 
terrorist organizations in Syria. Many of these women were under 20, and many of them were 
risking severe injury or death (Saltman & Smith, 2015).  
In the cases where the concern was categorized as right-wing, the narrative also started 
with a sudden change when the young woman met a new partner who was always portrayed 
as the reason for her change and for her committing to a white supremacist organization (in 
these cases, there was always an organizational commitment). A common theme in the 
narrative was that there had been no previous signs of racism or hate speech, and the callers 
were expressing their own, and the surrounding community’s, surprise and sadness about the 
development. One parent contacted the helpline about their 17-year-old daughter who had 
joined the Nordic Resistance Movement after she met an older man who was a longtime 
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member: “She has never expressed anything like this before she met him. We are in shock!” 
In this case and in similar cases, the relatives feared that the young woman might have been 
manipulated and that she was being drawn into something that she could not handle or 
control. The callers needed guidance in how they should address their relative or friend, 
without risking an escalating conflict that might lead to her turning further away from them.  
No matter the milieu in focus, there were some stereotypical perceptions in the 
radicalization discourse. Young women were regarded as helpless victims without any agency 
of their own. They were not considered to be responsible for being attracted by an extremist 
ideology or milieu. There was always a male partner who was the reason for the woman being 
drawn into a situation where she did not belong; that is, she was tricked and manipulated. In 
this sense, young women were being projected as passive victims without agency or will. 
Stereotypical perceptions of young women as passive (Skeggs, 2004) make it impossible to 
think that they might join of their own free will and an ideological desire to effect change. 
Another important aspect is that both the Islamic and the right-wing extremist milieus are 
defined by hypermasculine ideals that in turn generate a feminine ideal focused on 
motherhood. The feminine mission is to give birth to and raise future representatives of the 
nation and the people (Kimmel, 2007). 
 
Conclusions and Discussion 
 
The aim of this study was to explore a contemporary discourse of concern for radicalization 
by addressing the question: What are the signs of concern about radicalization cited by 
individuals who contact a helpline, and what can these tell us about the radicalization 
discourse? By exploring this topic, the similarities and differences in signs of concern related 
to Islamic versus right-wing extremism were also considered.  
As shown in the results from the data analysis, signs of concern are not only dependent 
on what the suspected extremist does, but also on who he or she is. This is true even if there 
are similarities with regard to what the suspected extremist does, such as expressing or 
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practicing ideological beliefs or religions, showing signs of mental illness, and engaging in 
certain activities on the Internet. It is apparent that these activities are what used to be known 
as “normal teenage activities.” However, even if these are (re)occurring themes, there are 
internal differences depending on what milieu the individual is suspected of being radicalized 
toward.  
The data indicate that concerns about Islamic radicalization revolve around individuals 
who convert to Islam, turning religious practice into suspicious behavior and behavior that 
could be regarded as unfamiliar or divergent compared to general Swedish practices. The 
callers were concerned about the young person’s well-being, but also about the harm that 
could be caused by the individual if he or she had in fact been radicalized. There was an 
obvious fear of being the one having information about a potential extremist if something 
were to happen. Thus, there are significant reasons for exploring how perceptions of these 
young religious Muslims are affected by discourses of second-hand terrorism (Comer & 
Kendall, 2007). In line with Rosseau et al. (2017), we tend to perceive risk through the lens of 
current cultural fears. It is not too much of a stretch to conclude that contemporary fear of 
terrorist deeds is aligned with Islamic terrorist organizations and the crimes committed by 
these groups in recent years in Europe. This fear has most probably affected the general 
public’s perceptions of what a terrorist is and what signs to be aware of.  
Concern about right-wing extremism was primarily related to young individuals 
joining a white supremacist organization or them making clear statements that support racism, 
anti-Semitism, and hate speech. In such instances, the caller’s main concern was how this 
could be stigmatizing for their loved ones or for their families and that their young would 
come to or cause harm. In comparison with concern about Islamic extremism, these cases 
reached the higher levels of a metaphorical radicalization staircase (Moghaddam, 2005) 
One similarity in what suspected extremists do that caused concern was that they 
displayed changes in behavior and well-being. Sudden isolation from others was one of the 
most frequently mentioned signs of something not being right. This could be regarded as 
general concern for a young person’s well-being that affects the adults’ world when their 
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young people no longer seek their advice and guidance, but instead turn to others. These 
others may belong to extremist milieus, but they can also be representatives of an 
organization, community, religious leaders, or other adults who offer a sense of belonging and 
stability (Bjørgo, 2013; Mattsson & Johansson, 2018). One factor that is important to shed 
more light on is how concern for radicalized young women was expressed by the callers. In 
the cases handled by the helpline, young women were primarily described as passive victims 
who had been easily manipulated by men.  
Discourses dictate the conditions for truth and the possibility and relevance of speech 
(Foucault, 1971). In the documented data, radicalization has a slightly different meaning 
depending on which particular concern is being addressed and the potential damage that could 
be the consequence of the apprehended radicalization. There are significant differences in 
how radicalization is perceived by the potential gatekeepers and vicarious help-seekers who 
make contact with the helpline. Their concerns about religious extremism focus on suspicions 
based on young Muslims practicing their religion, where fasting, praying, and reading the 
Quran are interpreted as possible signs of radicalization. In the words of Roy, “terrorism does 
not arise from the radicalization of Islam, but from the Islamization of radicalism” (2017, p. 
6). Concern about right-wing extremism occurs as young individuals express right-wing 
ideals or attitudes or when they join an organization. In these cases, we need to recognize that 
one of the differences between the milieus is that right-wing extremism is almost completely 
based on ideological premises that are generally rejected by the normative society, while 
Islamic extremism is related to a wider category of religious ideologies that is a part of many 
surrounding cultures (Koehler, 2017, p. 79). 
On another level, girls and young women are given a special position within the 
radicalization discourse, where the specific milieu or ideology has little or no importance with 
regard to the concerns about young women. In these cases, it seems that the elements 
contributing to the loss of control over the young women seem to be of greater significance. 
In light of this, radicalization becomes a normative construct that is given different meanings 
depending on the individual or milieu in focus. The radicalization discourse holds a strong 
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position and has the prerogative to make the actions and behaviors of (certain) young people 
intelligible. This was evident in the helpline documentation of instances where the fear of 
Islamic radicalization overshadowed other signs of concern for the youngsters’ well-being or 
mental health.  
Returning to the CVE discourse and the helpline as a preventive initiative for dealing 
with violent extremism, there is every reason for further investigation of how these 
interventions can support family and friends as associate gatekeepers (Williams et al., 2015). 
As this study indicates, information and knowledge about how to get support and guidance is 
lacking among peers and relatives. Knowing that colleagues, friends, and family can be a 
“first line of defense” against violent extremism (Koehler & Ehrt, 2018), helplines and other 
supportive structures offered by governmental or non-governmental organizations can be of 
great importance in empowering them to be such a defense and enabling them to make a 
difference. 
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